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THE FILM COLLECTOR, THE FBI,
AND THE COPYRIGHT ACT
FRANCIS M. NEVINS, JR.*
W E ARE PRESENTLY IN THE early middle stages of a media revolution
which will reach its climax when films, in one form or another, will
be found in people's homes and under consumers' control in much the
same way as books and phonograph records. Although the availability of
home videotaping equipment represents a giant step forward in the pro-
cess, the revolution began long before the invention of the Betamax. For
well over twenty years hobbyist film collectors, currently between 20,000
and 120,000 in number,' have been purchasing sixteen and thirty-five
millimeter prints of both copyrighted and public domain films, and have
been screening these prints in their own homes for the private enjoyment
of themselves, their family, and friends. When a collector grows tired of a
particular film, he customarily swaps it for another print in someone else's
collection, or sells it to another collector and uses the money to buy an
additional print.2 Unfortunately, collectors have been subjected to a
great deal of legal harassment in recent years, not only in the form of
actual and threatened civil suits for copyright infringement but also in
the form of warrantless and totally illegal print confiscations by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). This Article will analyze current
developments in both the civil and criminal law as they relate to the hobby
of film collecting.
I. How PRINTS ENTER THE MARKET
The most common question asked by people who have never heard of
the hobby is: Where do these prints come from? This is indeed a key
question. A factual analysis of the routes by which film prints enter the
collectors' market must precede any legal evaluation of collectors' prac-
tices. 3
First of all, a considerable number of films are in the public domain, so
that anyone may duplicate, sell, exhibit, lease, or make any other commer-
cial use of any print. It is amazing how many thousands of films have
become available in this way simply because no one bothered to renew
the copyright.4
J.D., New York University; Professor of Law, St. Louis University.
I There are no established criteria for determining how many films one must own or
how actively one must pursue the hobby in order to be classified as a film collector. The
fact that many collectors keep low profiles has not made the task of estimating the group's
size any easier.
2 For a more detailed account of film collecting and its legal ramifications, see Nevins,
Copyright, Property and the Film Collector, 29 RUT. L. REv. 2 (1975).
3 For a more detailed account of certain aspects of the material covered in this sub-
section, see Nevins, Copyright, Property and the Film Collector, 29 RUT. L. REV. 2,
4-7 (1975).
I Some enterprising film devotees have come up with a quick and fairly reliable un- 1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1977
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
Secondly, at one time or another the studios or their licensees have
offered a wide variety of copyrighted films for sale or quasi-sale to the
general public for non-commercial home screening.5 As more and more
companies recognize the huge potential bonanza that the old films in their
vaults might earn from this previously undreamt-of market, it is expected
that they will eventually respond to the collecting phenomenon like
businessmen and make all of their films available to the consumer in
home-use format. The United States Government itself, through its Postal
and Customs Services, has been known to auction off film prints that were
unclaimed or damaged in transit.
As is well known, however, film studios do not routinely transfer title
to copies of their product directly to the consumer, in the manner of book
publishers and phonograph record manufacturers. Rather, they work
through intermediaries, such as theaters and television stations, who are
licensed to exhibit prints under certain conditions and for fixed periods of
time. At the end of the contractual period the prints are commonly re-
turned to the distributor or destroyed under affidavit of destruction. How-
ever, many contracts between television stations and distributors do not
require return of prints, but permit the station to keep the print upon pay-
ment of a specified fee. Certain distributors do not object to making
special arrangements with the station program directors which result in
the director keeping the print after its run upon payment of a nominal
salvage charge. Distributors whose business depends on selling exhibi-
tion rights to the stations are often willing to do such favors for key station
personnel. If the station employee then sells or trades such prints to a
collector or dealer friend, the prints may be resold any number of times
without infringement upon the copyright holder's rights, although it is
still illegal for any owner of the print to make commercial use of the film
itself.
Another access route is provided by film salvage dealers. Many studios
dispose of what they consider to be junk prints by chopping them into
pieces and then transferring them in bulk to specialized companies whose
business is to erase the images on the film stock and turn the stock into
blank leader or magnetic tape or, in the case of black-and-white films, to
retrieve their silver content by chemical process.6 Some contractors have
apparently been able to reconstruct complete prints out of the fragments
they receive, and have sold such prints to used-film dealers who in turn
sell them to collectors.
official guide to the number of film copyrights that are not renewed by publishing bound,
photocopied editions of the Catalogue of Copyright Entries covering motion pictures,
annotated with renewal data as to each film that has in fact been renewed.' Hundreds
upon hundreds of films, according to these sources, are in the public domain today for
nonrenewal. See J. MiNus & W. S. HALE, FILM SupEnusr: 20,000 MOTION PicrTUES IN
THE U.S. PUBLIC DOMAIN (1973); B. WEBSTER, Punuc DOMAIN FiLms: 1940 To 1947 1/2
(1976).
5 See Trial Brief for Defendant at 64-66, American International Pictures, Inc. v.
Foreman, 400 F. Supp. 928 (S.D. Ala. 1975).
6 See United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1184-85, 1192-93 (9th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Drebin, 557 F.2d 1316, 1327-28 (9th Cir. 1977).
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A further avenue of access is provided by the film processing labora-
tories which manufacture prints for the studios. If a studio orders, say,
twenty fresh sixteen millimeter prints of a certain title, the laboratory
might surrepititiously produce a few extra, and pass these on to used film
dealers. Such prints would be originals, made from the legal negatives,
and there would be no records of their existence.
Then there are the clearly dubious means of access, the temporary
disappearances of prints from studio vaults, laboratories, theaters, or the
mail for just long enough to permit the making of a duplicate negative in a
private laboratory. Later, of course, "dupe" positives will be printed from
this negative and sold to collectors. Also, film prints are often stolen from'
studio vaults, from the mails, or from heavy institutional users like the
armed services, and sold to collectors without illegal duplication.
In short, there are many avenues into the collectors' market, some
clearly legitimate, some clearly illegitimate, and some profoundly ambi-
guous. But there is no way to inspect a particular print to determine its
origin. No print is labeled with a genealogical tag describing its roots,
and indeed until 1970 the studios did not even keep records of how many
sixteen millimeter prints of their films had been legitimately made. If a
copyright holder brings an infringement suit against a person for the bare
act of selling a film print without authorization, the origin of that print
becomes a crucial issue.
II. THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE
The reason why is grounded in a principle of copyright law known as
the "first sale" doctrine. 7 Under this rule, which was codified in section
27 of the 1909 Copyright Act8 and section 109(a) of the Copyright Act
of 1976,9 once a particular copy of any copyrighted work has been trans-
ferred under conditions constituting a "first sale," then the copyright
holder's exclusive right to vend that copy of the work ° is exhausted, and
the "first sold" copy may legally be resold again and again thereafter.
If not for this common sense doctrine, secondhand store proprietors would
infringe upon the right to vend every time they sold a used book or phono-
graph record to a customer. All copies of a copyrighted work are likely to
be virtually identical in appearance, however, and the transfer of such a
copy is generally not accompanied by a document in writing such as in the
transfer of real property. Consequently, it is all but impossible in any
given situation to trace the chain of title to a particular copy in a posses-
sor's hands and determine whether it had been the subject of a so-called
For a more detailed account of this doctrine and the cases thereunder up to 1975, see
Nevins, Copyright, Property and the Film Collector, 29 RUT. L. REv. 2, 18-25 (1975).
8 17 U.S.C. § 27 (1976), superseded by 17 U.S.C.A. § 109(a) (West Supp. 1977).
9 17 U.S.C.A. § 109(a) (West Supp. 1977).
10 The exclusive right to "vend" is granted by 17 U.S.C. § 1(a) (1976). Under the new
Copyright Act the analogous right is called the right "to distribute copies of phonorecords
of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental,
lease, or lending." 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(3) (West Supp. 1977). For the formulation of the
"first sale" doctrine under the new act, see text accompanying note 16 infra.
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"first sale." When a copyright holder distributes copies of a work and
then sues someone for selling copies of the same work without authoriza-
tion, and there is no proof that what the defendant sold were infringing
copies, it would be outrageous if the law required the defendant to prove
that the precise copies he sold had been "first sold" by the plaintiff.
Clearly, whoever has the burden of proof as to origin loses the case, and
equally clear are the policy reasons why the courts have imposed the bur-
den of proving absence of "first sales" on plaintiffs in copyright in-
fringement cases arising out of alleged violations of the right to vend."
III. THE CIVIL PRECEDENT
The most important civil precedent with respect to the copyright as-
pects of the sale of film prints to collectors is American International Pic-
tures, Inc. v. Foreman.2 Seven of the major distributors brought simul-
taneous and identical infringement actions against Evan Foreman, a used-
film dealer. The suits did not allege that Foreman manufactured or sold
infringing copies, but only that he was selling prints of certain copyrighted
films without authority. Foreman's defense rested on the "first sale"
doctrine. At trial the studios presented proof merely that they were or
represented the holders of copyrights in the films at issue, and that Fore-
man had sold prints of those films without authorization. As for the "first
sale" issue, each studio supplied a single employee who took the stand
and testified that his studio never sold prints of any of its films. If this
testimony was to be believed, it followed by deduction that the studios had
never "first sold" prints of the particular films at issue. The defense
discredited these witnesses, however, by establishing on cross-examina-
tion that they did not know enough about the practices of their own
studios to be able to make such sweeping declarations under oath.
Furthermore, Foreman's attorneys argued that over the years the plaintiff
studios had transferred huge numbers of prints - not necessarily prints of
the films at issue - to television stations, salvage dealers, and other par-
ties under circumstances which made those transfers "first sales" under
section 27. If this argument was to be accepted, the court could reason-
ably conclude that some prints of the films at issue had probably been
" This country, with its free commerce and highly developed economy, has a legit-
imate interest in ensuring that goods of all types and descriptions, whether embody-
ing copyrighted materials or not, move freely in commerce . . . . The movement
of goods in commerce would be severely inhibited, if not stifled altogether, if
each person handling a product in the chain of distribution were required, under
peril of copyright infringement, to seek written permission of the purported copy-
right holder in order to pass the product on to the wholesaler, jobber, distributor,
retailer or consumer. Not only would commerce in books and magazines and
films come to a halt, but so would much other commerce. The ludicrous results
which could be reached are demonstrated by the fact that the label on Donald Duck
Orange Juice bears a legend reflecting a claim of copyright by Walt Disney Pro-
ductions.
Trial Brief for Defendant at 8, American International Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman, 400 F.
Supp. 928 (S.D. Ala. 1975).
12 400 F. Supp. 928 (S.D. Ala. 1975).
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transferred in the same way. The district judge agreed with Foreman,
holding that the burden was on the plaintiff in such cases to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that no "first sales" of prints of the films
at issue had occurred, and that the studios had failed to sustain that bur-
den. The decision is now on appeal to the Fifth Circuit.'
3
Despite court reversals under the 1909 Act, the former FBI agents who
now run the Film Security Office of the Motion Picture Association of
America (MPAA) would like to scare collectors into believing that the
Copyright Act of 1976, which went into effect January 1, 1978, has
changed the law in the studios' favor. A full-page "Notice" was prepared
by the Film Security Office in late 1977 and printed as an advertisement
in Variety and several major film collector publications, claiming that
under the new act:
Anyone trafficking in copyrighted motion pictures without
authorization (whether as a buyer, seller, trader, copier, exhibi-
tor, etc.) in violation of the exclusive rights conferred by federal
law upon the owner of a copyright is an infringer - and is liable
for all of the penalties provided by U.S. copyright law.' 4
This single sentence contains at least two false statements. First, the
cases under the 1909 Act make it quite clear that the mere purchase or
possession of a copyrighted film print is not an infringement, even if the
print was illegally manufacutured. 5 Nothing in the new Act purports
to change this long established doctrine. Second, there is absolutely no
authority supporting the claim that the common collector practice of
print-swapping constitutes infringement, for the simple reason that there
are no cases on this point at all. The new Act is likewise silent on the
matter.
It is true, of course, that the selling of a print of a copyrighted film
without authorization may be an infringing act, but as we have seen, the
Foreman decision on the burden of proof with respect to "first sale"
makes a successful right-to-vend action against a seller of prints next to
impossible. The Film Security Office, however, has entered a rebuttal on
this issue. "Don't rely on the Foreman case," its Notice advises collec-
tors, because under the new Copyright Act:
Congress has expressly disavowed the Foreman decision and has
13 The district court's decision has been cited with approval in United States v. Bfly,
406 F. Supp. 726, 732 n. 9 (E.D. Pa. 1975), and in M. NMMEn, NIMMER ON CoPYmiGcr
§139.5 (1976). For a case somewhat contrary, see Avco Embassy Pictures Corp. v.
Korshnak, 189 U.S.P.Q. 303 (N.D. Pa. 1974).
Since this Article was first written, the Fifth Circuit handed down a decision
reversing the District Court. American Int'l. Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman, [1978] Copyright Law
Rep. (CCH) 25,024. The Fifth Circuit decision is analysed in the Appendix infra at 559.
14 The Notice was printed, among other places, in The Big Reel, December, 1977,
at 64; and in Film Collector's World.
15 Foreign & Domestic Music Corp. v. Licht, 196 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1952); Jewelers'
Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 274 F. 932 (S.D.N'Y. 1921), afi'd,
281 F. 83 12d Cir. 1922).
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clearly stated its intent that "the burden of proving whether a
particular copy was lawfully made or acquired should rest on the
defendant." . . . In other words, it is not enough for you to- just
demonstrate the source from whom you acquired the prints and
that you paid for them, but you will be held responsible for show-
ing that the seller (and his seller) had the right to sell the par-
ticular prints.1 6
As before, the writers of the Notice have misstated the law and the facts
in an attempt to frighten collectors. In reality, the "first sale" doctrine
is carried over intact into section 109(a) of the new law, which reads in
part as follows: "The owner of a particular copy .. . lawfully made un-
der this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without
the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the
possession of that copy."' 7 This formulation, like the analogous language
under the old Act, leaves open the question of who has the burden of
establishing ownership of a particular copy and the lawfulness of its mak-
ing. Nothing in the new Act itself purports to change the Foreman
decision on this issue. However, the House Judiciary Committee Report
on the new Act contains a paragraph which reads as follows:
During the course of its deliberations on this section, the Com-
mittee's attention was directed to a recent court decision holding
that the plaintiff in an infringement action had the burden of
establishing that the allegedly infringing copies in the de-
fendant's possession were not lawfully made or acquired under
section 27 of the present law. American International Pictures,
Inc. v. Foreman, 400 F. Supp. 928 (S.D. Alabama 1975). The
Committee believes that the court's decision, if followed, would
place a virtually impossible burden on copyright owners. The de-
cision is also inconsistent with the established legal principle that
the burden of proof should not be placed upon a litigant to es-
tablish facts particularly within the knowledge of his adversary.
The defendant in such actions clearly has the particular knowl-
edge of how possession of the particular copy was acquired, and
should have the burden of providing this evidence to the court. It
is the intent of the Committee, therefore, that in an action to de-
termine whether a defendant is entitled to the privilege estab-
lished by section 109(a) and (b), the burden of proving whether
a particular copy was lawfully made or acquired should rest on
the defendant.' 8
Two things must be kept in mind about this paragralh of legislative
history. First, despite the implication of the MPAA Notice to the con-
trary, it is not a part of the Copyright Act, and courts are not required to
16 See note 14 supra.
17 17 U.S.C.A. 6 109(a) (West Supp. 1977).
1s H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 80-81 (1976).
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follow it. Second and much more important, even if a court wishes to give
effect to the legislative intent as embodied in the quoted paragraph, the
Committee quite clearly intended to change the Foreman rule on burden
of proof only in cases in which there are "allegedly infringing copies in
the defendant's possession" and the defendant claims to be the owner
of such copies with the right to resell them. In other words, if the plaintiff
can make out a prima facie case that what the defendant sold were
infringing copies, then the burden shifts to the defendant to establish
that he is the lawful owner of the copies in question. Restricted to this
precise situation, the paragraph from the Committee Report makes a
certain amount of sense. It must be recalled, however, that Evan Fore-
man was not sued for selling infringing copies, but rather for the bare
act of sellingl The studios did not even claim that he was selling
pirated prints. Obviously, the draftsman of the quoted paragraph was
seriously confused about the issues in the Foreman case. But in any
event the Report does not evidence an intent to alter the allocation of
burden. in the actual Foreman situation in which the defendant is sued
merely for selling. The Report does indicate that when the studio
establishes that a defendant was selling infringing copies, then and only
then will he be required to substantiate any claim that he was the copies'
lawful owner.
IV. THE CRIMINAL PRECEDENTS
The publication of false and misleading legal notices is far from the
worst sin of the MPAA Film Security Office. Much more frightening
has been the manner in which the former FBI agents who administer
this office have used their colleagues in the Bureau as a sort of private
goon squad to harass film collectors. Dozens of hobbyists have seen
their homes invaded and their prints confiscated without search war-
rants by federal agents acting at the Film Security Office's behest.
The films confiscated are not pornography but mainstream American
genre movies - Westerns, suspense pictures, adventure and horror films,
musicals, cliffhanger serials, and even comedies like the "Three Stooges"
pictures. The collectors are not charged with a crime, but often find
that the cost of suing for the return of their confiscated prints will ap-
proach or exceed the prints' value, and resign themselves to being
victimized.
The only basis for FBI involvement in the hobby of film collecting is
the rarely-used provision in the copyright law dealing with criminal
infringements. Under the 1909 Act, it was a federal misdemeanor,
punishable by a fine of between $100 and $1,000 or imprisonment for
up to one year or both, to "willfully and for profit" infringe a copy-
right or to "knowingly and willfully aid or abet such infringement.' 9
Under the new Act the crime consists of infringing a copyright "willfully
and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain,"'20
19 17 U.S.C. § 104 (1976).
20 17 U.S.C.A. § 506(a) (West Supp 1977).
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and the penalty for criminally infringing a motion picture copyright is
considerably stiffer than the general criminal infringement penalties under
either the old Act or the new.2 ' The clearest example of criminal copy-
right infringement, of course, is the unauthorized mass duplication of a
copyrighted work, followed by sale of the infringing copies. This is
classical piracy of the sort that has plagued the sound recording industry
for years, and the Government has had little trouble in getting convictions
against such "record pirates" upheld on appeal. 22 Unfortunately, the
FBI seems either unable or unwilling to concentrate its attention in the
film field on the buccaneers who make and systematically sell illegally-
reproduced film prints. Indeed not a single one of the three "film
piracy" decisions reported to date deal with duplication and sale.
Rather, all three were prosecutions for the bare act of selling prints
without authorization - the same practice which was upheld civilly in
the Foreman case. Like Evan Foreman, the criminal defendants
grounded much of their argument on the "first sale" doctrine.
In the earliest of the trio, United States v. Wise,23 the defendant
was charged with seven counts of infringement arising out of his sales
of one print of each of seven recent big-budget movies like Funny Girl
and The Sting. Unlike the plaintiffs in Foreman, who had merely pro-
duced witnesses to testify that in general prints are not sold, the prose-
cution in Wise brought forth executives from the studios holding copy-
rights in the six films at issue, who testified that no prints of these
particular films had ever been sold. After hearing such testimony, and
after scrutinizing every contract entered into by the copyright holders
with respect to prints of those films which might arguably have consti-
tuted "first sales" under section 27, the trial judge held that a "first
sale" had occurred with respect to one of the films but that the ambigu-
ous television and "V.I.P." contracts vis-a-vis the other six films were
licenses, not transfers of title, and convicted Wise on those six counts.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that studio transfers with respect to
two of the six films amounted to "first sales," but sustained Wise's
conviction on the remaining four counts.
The appellate court's decision, however unfavorable to Wise per-
sonally, made several points which were bound to be of benefit to
potential future defendants. Firstly, the court held that if the Govern-
ment cannot establish the source of the films sold by the defendant, it
will not be permitted to take the short cut attempted by the studios in
Foreman - to rely on generalized testimony that prints are not sold - but
21 The general penalty for criminal infringement under section 506 of the new Act is a
fine of up to $10,000 or imprisonment for up to one year or both. The penalty for
criminally infringing a sound recording or motion picture copyright under the same sec-
tion is a fine of up to $25,000 or imprisonment for up to one year or both, provided that
the infringement is the defendant's first such offense. For subsequent offenses the penalty
rises to a maximum fine of $50,000 and a maximum prison term of two years.
22 See United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1040 (1977).
23 550 F.2d 1180 (5th Cir. 1977).
[Vol. 26: 547
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol26/iss4/7
FILM COLLECTOR AND COPYRIGHT ACT
must prove the absence of even a single "first sale" of a print of each
film in question. Thus, only if industry witnesses are available who
can testify from firsthand knowledge about "the specific films involved
in the alleged infringement"2 4 does the prosecution have a chance of
success. Wise makes a conviction for selling prints of older films vir-
tually inconceivable.
Secondly, the decision imposes on the trial court the duty to scrutinize
every contract entered into by the copyright holder for the exhibition
or distribution of prints of each film at issue which might arguably
constitute a "first sale." True, the Wise court's view of what do and
do not constitute "first sales" was rather generous to the film industry,
but the court's language seems to suggest that the older and less popu-
lar the movie, and the less potential it has for "license revenue," the
more likely it is that a court will find ambiguous contracts respecting
the film to be "first sales.."2 5
Thirdly, willfulness, as we have seen, is an essential element in the
offense of criminal copyright infringement. Wise held that in order to
satisfy its burden on this element the Government must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant "knew that the film which he sold
had not been first sold by the copyright owner."2 6 This is a heavy
burden indeed, and although the Government presented a strong case on
scienter in the Wise prosecution, such evidence simply doesn't exist in
the case of occasional print sales by hobbyist collectors.
United States v. Drebin27 was a similar prosecution, charging un-
authorized sale of prints of six recent major films like Paper Moon
and The Way We Were. Defendants were convicted by a jury on all
counts, and the convictions were sustained by the Ninth Circuit in a
decision written by Judge Jameson, who had also authored the Wise
opinion. As in Wise, the court showed a strong tendency to classify all
ambiguous studio contracts as licenses rather than sales. Amazingly,
the defendants did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on the
issue of willfulness, and consequently there is no discussion in Drebin of
how the Government attempted to prove that the defendants knew that
no prints of the six films had been "first sold."2 8
In the most recent and in this author's view the most important of
the cases on point, United States v. Atherton,2 9 the defendant was
charged with selling prints of five recent big-budget films, including
The Exorcist. As usual, the government made no attempt to establish
24 Id. at 1190.
25 "Although appellant produced evidence of several sales of films by studios, they
were films which had .been produced many years ago and were not recent box-office
attractions, which are generally not sold until all readily obtainable license revenue has
been extracted from them." Id. at 1195.
26 Id. at 1194.
27 557 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1977).
21 The court in the later case of United States v. Atherton stated that "the evidence
with respect to [Atherton's] knowledge of first sale, unlike the evidence in the Wise and
Drebin cases, was slight." 561 F.2d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 1977) (emphasis added).
29 561 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1977).
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the source from which Atherton had acquired his, prints, but relied on
testimony from studio executives that no prints of the five films had
ever been sold. However, the convictions obtained in this case were
reversed on appeal in a noteworthy opinion by Judge Shirley Huf-
stedler, who held that certain transfers to television networks, industry
personnel, and salvage companies that had admittedly been entered into
by the copyright holders vis-a-vis four of the five films constituted
"first sales." With respect to the fifth movie, uncontroverted studio
testimony established that at the time Atherton sold a print of The
Exorcist, that film had not been the subject of a single television or
"V.I.P." contract or salvage transfer. Nevertheless the court reversed
Atherton's conviction on that count also, on the ground that the Gov-
ernment had failed to prove that Atherton knew there had been no
"first sales" of The Exorcist. Judge Hufstedler pointed out that on
retrial of that count the prosecution would have an opportunity to remedy
the defect in its evidence on the scienter element.30
In short, the government must prove five elements in a copyright
prosecution: "(1) Infringement of a copyright, (2) of a work that has not
been the subject of a 'first sale,' (3) done willfully, (4) with knowledge
that the copyrighted work has not been the subject of a 'first sale,' and
(5) for profit."'" All elements, of course, must be established beyond a
reasonable doubt. In view of the case law, it is obviously impossible
for the government to obtain a criminal conviction against the typical
hobbyist film collector who sells a few items in his collection now and
then in order to obtain funds for additional prints. But the purpose or
at least the effect of the FBI confiscations is not to obtain evidence
against criminals. Rather, it is to terrify collectors and to short-circuit
the difficulties the Foreman rule places in the way of a civil suit by the
studios. Having confiscated a collector's films, the agents generally
notify the Film Security Office, and the appropriate copyright holders'
representatives file a motion in due course asking the court to turn over
the seized prints to them. Their theory, of course, is the totally dis-
credited one that no film print is ever "first sold." If the collector is
willing to pay a copyright attorney to resist the motion, he is quite likely
to win in view of the Foreman rule. Many collectors, however, fear
that they will wind up paying more to the lawyers than the prints them-
selves are worth, and decide to cut their losses. Even though the cases
support the collector, the collector loses de facto simply because the
Film Security Office managers have deceived their former colleagues in
the FBI, whose agents have never been known for their copyright ex-
pertise, into believing that prints of copyrighted films, like hard drugs,
are contraband per se, illegal to own and subject to seizure where found.
Early in 1977 a teen-age film collector and supermarket clerk named
Robert Frischmann placed an ad in a collector newspaper offering a few
of his prints for sale. The ad was read by someone in the Film Security
31 Id. at 752. It has, since been reported that Mr. Atherton has pleaded guilty to in-
fringing the Exorcist copyright in return for a suspended sentence.
31 United States v. Atherton, 561 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1977).
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Office, who alerted the FBI. A team of agents posing as collectors
visited Frischmann's St. Louis home, without a search warrant, and
offered him $200 for one of his prints. As soon as the transaction was
over the agents flashed their badges, took their money back, seized the
print they had purchased and all other prints in plain view, and left.
Unlike most collectors, Frischmann chose to fight. His suit filed in
Federal District Court seeks declaratory, injunctive, and substantial
monetary relief against the individual agents, the United States At-
torney for the district, the federal government, and the Motion Picture
Association of America.3 2  If his action is successful, the FBI may be
forced to study a little elementary copyright law before making any
further print seizures.
V. CONCLUSION AND PROGNOSIS
The recent mass marketing of home videotaping equipment such
as the Sony Betamax opens the world of film collecting, albeit in dif-
ferent format, to countless men and women less affluent than the typical
sixteen millimeter hobbyist. Even though the building of a library of
film cassettes taped from one's own television set does not require
the intermediacy of a used-film dealer as in traditional collecting, it
is this author's prediction that many persons and organizations will
appear on the scene, some licensed by copyright holders and some
acting on their own, offering cassettes of all sorts of theatrical and
television films, uncut, uncensored, unpolluted by incessant commer-
cials, and therefore much more desirable than most of what can be
recorded from the home screen. Those consumers who are fortunate
enough to own both a videocassette recorder and one of the new gigantic
television screen systems will be able to enjoy both the large clear
image insisted on by the traditional collector and the minimal per unit
cost and ease and economy of storage prized by the Betamax devotee.
Consumer control over the films seen in the home is the most
important media revolution of our time, promising all sorts of changes in
the ways we think about, deal with, and relate to the films that are so
much a part of our lives. It is an all but accomplished fact, opening
up possibilities of great new revenues to copyright holders and others
and of new kinds of enjoyment to cinephiles. The prevention of classi-
cal piracy - the systematic unauthorized duplication and sale of film
prints for profit - is itself a proper function of government, but to go
beyond this function and seek to discourage the private possession of
films per se is not a legitimate purpose under either the civil or criminal
provisions of the Copyright Act.n The spirit of the medieval monks
32 Frischmann v. United States, No. 77-0960-C(A) (E.D. Mo.) (filed Sept. 6, 1977).
3 Thus, it is in keeping with the policy of the act for courts to be careful not to
chill dealing in creative works, when that conduct approaches, but does not cross
the borderline of infringement . . . . The non-infringing use and dissemination of
creative material is considered not merely innocent activity but a public benefit.
Any attempts at enforcing the Act which chill or unduly burden noninfringing use
of copyright works, contradict the policy of the Act.
United States v. Bily, 406 F. Supp. 726, 730, 735 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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who tried to discourage literacy and the wide private ownership of
books lives on, at least for the moment, in the bodies of the Hollywood
bureaucrats who are responsible for the harassment of film collectors.
Eventually, social and technological forces will consign these obstruc-
tionists to the dustbin of history with their monkish ancestors. Slowly
but surely, the combined power of law, technology, and economic self-
interest will lead to the open, widespread, and inexpensive availability
of virtually any film a consumer might want to own, and thereby bring
to completion the foremost media revolution of our time.
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol26/iss4/7
APPENDIX
On July 17, 1978, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed the District Court's decision in the Foreman case discussed in Part III
of this article.'
The appellate court's decision is rather sloppy and ill-informed and
betrays a basic unfamiliarity with copyright principles. For example, Judge
Godbold's discussion of the legislative history of Section 109(c) of the new
Copyright Act2 indicates his unawareness of the factual errors described on
pages 552-53 of this Article. Elsewhere in his opinion he makes two absurd
suggestions: that a copyright certificate alone constitutes prima facie evidence
that no first sales have occurred; 3 and that purchasing a copy of a copyrighted
work that has not been the subject of a "first sale" may constitute copyright
infringement.4 But these are mere dicta, and it is hoped that they will not
mislead other courts in the future.
The essence of the appellate decision concerns the burden of proof on the
"first sale" issue. The court held that "the person claiming authority
to .. .vend generally must show that his authority to do so flows from the
copyright holder." 5 The court specifically ruled that mere possession of a
print of the film is not sufficient to meet the burden. But nowhere does the
opinion clearly state to what length a defendant must go to prove that
authority. Once the plaintiff produces a valid copyright ceretificate and
credible testimony that no prints of a particular film were ever "first sold,"
then the defendant "must produce evidence to show" that a first sale occurred
with respect to one or more prints of that particular film. If the defendant can
establish such a first sale, the court stated, the burden may then shift back to
the studio plaintiffs to show that the particular copies sold or offered for sale
by the defendant had not been the subjects of "first sales." If the defendant
can establish that he purchased his print of a particular film from such sources
as a film library or a junk dealer, then the court states that the burden may shift
back to the plaintiffs to "trace title backward to an illegitimate acquisition."7
Despite the murkiness of the language, the Fifth Circuit decision clearly
requires a defendant in a civil right-to-vend case to show something about
how he obtained the particular film prints for which sale he has been sued.
Furthermore, the decision requires the trial court to make specific findings of
fact as to whether any prints of each specific film involved in the suit have ever
been "first sold." And a necessary implication of the ruling - at least to this
writer - is that a defendant in a right-to-vend action must be given great
latitude during the discovery phase of the action, to the point of receiving
copies of every scrap of paper in the studio plaintiffs' possession that might
IAmerican Int'l Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman, [19781 Copyright Law Rep. (CCH) 25.024.
2 Id. at 15,117 n.1.
'Id. at 15,119.
Id. at 15,118.
Id. at 15,119.
6 Id.
7 Id.
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tend to show a "first sale" of even a single print of any film involved in the suit.
Since studio records as to older films are generally a shambles, plaintiffs
might be discouraged from bringing Foreman-type suits in the future except
perhaps for alleged infringement of recent movies where studio records may
be in better order. Finally, it must be remembered that the Fifth Circuit
decision applies only to civil actions, and in no way affects the government's
burden in criminal copyright infringement prosecutions as that burden has
been described in Part IV of this article.
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol26/iss4/7
